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The “developing world’s middle class” is defined here 
as those who are not poor when judged by the median 
poverty line of developing countries, but are still poor 
by US standards. The “Western middle class” is defined 
as those who are not poor by US standards. Although 
barely 80 million people in the developing world entered 
the Western middle class over 1990-2002, economic 
growth and distributional shifts allowed an extra 1.2 
billion people to join the developing world’s middle class. 
Four-fifths came from Asia, and half from China. Most 
of the new entrants remained fairly close to poverty, 
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with incomes now bunched up just above $2 a day. 
The vulnerability of this new middle class to aggregate 
economic contractions is evident in the fact that one 
in six people in the developing world live between $2 
and $3 per day. Over time, the developing world has 
become more sharply divided between countries with a 
large middle class and those with a relatively small one, 
with Africa prominent in the latter group. Poor people in 
countries with smaller middle classes may well be more 
exposed to slowing economic growth. 
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Introduction 
As the financial crisis emanating from the US spills over to the developing world in 
2008/09, many people are asking whether there will be a reversal of the recent progress against 
poverty. This will depend in part on the distribution of the impacts of the crisis, and it should not 
be presumed that the poorest will be affected most; ironically, the same things that have kept 
many people poor in the first place—geographic isolation and poor connectivity with national 
and global markets—will help protect them from this crisis.2  
The prospects for reversing past progress will also depend on the distribution of past 
gains, in so far as this will determine how many people might be vulnerable to even small 
income losses. Consider Figure 1, which plots three hypothetical cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs). The initial distribution is marked “A”.  If all incomes increase by a similar 
proportion then the distribution shifts to “B”. There will be a fall in poverty across all possible 
poverty lines and a wide range of measures.3  
Alternatively (and there are other alternatives), the gains may be larger at lower poverty 
lines, with little or no reduction in poverty at high lines, as in distribution “C.” Poverty is also 
unambiguously lower for C than A, but C has a bigger bulge in the middle of the distribution, in 
that the density is appreciably higher at the median than for B and this holds in a wide interval 
around the median. In terms of the prospects of falling below relatively low poverty lines, 
distribution C has more people vulnerable to an aggregate economic contraction than B.  
   So it is important to know whether the developing world has moved toward a distribution 
more like C than B. While there have been a number of empirical studies of global poverty and 
inequality,4 this issue has been neglected.  
This paper aims to fill this gap in knowledge. The following section discusses the generic 
issues that arise in measuring the size of the “middle class” in developing countries and proposes 
a new definition. The paper then presents empirical results on the size of the middle class, how it 
has changed over time, and the proximate causes of the observed cross-country differences in the 
pace at which the middle class has grown. Some observations are also made on the possible 
                                                 
2   For evidence on this point in the context of the longer-term impacts of the Indonesian financial crisis in 1998 see 
Ravallion and Lokshin (2007). 
3   As shown by Atkinson (1987), if the CDFs for two distributions do not intersect up to some maximum poverty 
line, then the ordinal comparison is robust to both the poverty line and the precise poverty measure, within a broad 
class of additive measures.  
4   Contributions include Bourguignon and Morrison (2002), Chen and Ravallion (2004, 2008), Milanovic (2005) 
and Sala-i-Martin (2006); for a recent survey of this literature see Ferreira and Ravallion (2009). 
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implications of these empirical findings for assessing the poverty impacts of the diminished 
growth prospects of developing countries, in the wake of the 2008/09 crisis.   
 
1. Measuring the middle class 
There is a large literature on defining and measuring the “middle class” in the context of 
developed countries, where the main issue has been the (claimed) decline in the middle class in 
the US (and some other Western countries) over recent decades. Typically, being “middle class” 
is defined as having an income within some interval that includes the median and the interval has 
typically been symmetric in the income space around the median. The lower and upper bounds 
have been set in diverse and ad hoc ways.  An influential early paper by Thurow (1987) focused 
on the interval from 75% to 125% of the median. The literature has shown signs of converging 
on Thurow’s definition; for example, this is Pressman’s (2007) definition in his study of whether 
there has been a decline in the middle class for 11 developed countries, including the US.  
Amongst the studies that have used data for developing countries (sometimes with 
developed countries), the main issue has been the role of the middle class in promoting economic 
development, such as through entrepreneurship, policy reform and institutional change.5 But 
there is little sign of agreement on what the “middle-class” means. In keeping with much of the 
literature on the US, Birdsall et al. (2000) defined the middle class as those with incomes 
between 75% and 125% of the median in each country. In contrast to this relative definition 
(with real-income bounds specific to each country), other authors have defined the middle class 
in purely absolute terms (with common bounds across countries). Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) 
defined the middle class as those living between the mean incomes of Brazil and Italy,6 while 
Banerjee and Duflo (2008) identified the “middle class” in developing countries as those living 
between $2 and $10 a day. The latter two studies do not even use overlapping intervals; nobody 
is likely to be “middle class” by both the Milanovic-Yitzhaki and Banerjee-Duflo definitions.7 
In large part this is a matter of whether one is after a definition appropriate to rich 
countries or poor ones. People living below $10 a day would clearly not be considered “middle 
class” in most developed countries; indeed, they would be living well below the US poverty line, 
                                                 
5   See, for example, the discussions in Birdsall et al. (2000), Easterly (2001), Sridharan (2004) and Banerjee and 
Duflo (2008).  
6   Also see Bussolo et al. (2008) (and their results reported in World Bank, 2007) who use the Milanovic-Yitzhaki 
definition in identifying a “global middle class.” 
7   Brazil’s mean consumption per capita (from national accounts) was about $12 per day in 2005. 
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which was about $13 a day in 2005.8 Yet it is likely that many people in developing countries 
living below the US poverty line, and the Milanovic-Yitzhaki standard, would be deemed 
“middle class”. Consider the two most populous countries. The closest concept to “middle class” 
in China is “Xiaokang;” eventually achieving the “Xiaokang society” is the goal of China’s 
reforms, instigated in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. The Government of China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics set a minimum income for Xiaokang in 1991; when converted to 
2005 PPP $’s, Xiaokang requires $2.24 per day in rural areas and $3.47 a day in urban areas; I 
estimate that over 500 million Chinese were Xiaokang by 2005 (using PovcalNet), which (as we 
will see) far exceeds the number living above the US poverty line. It is clear that many people 
who would be deemed “poor” in the US are thought of as middle class in China.  
This is true in India too. It is often claimed that 300 million people are now “middle 
class” in India; see, for example, the Wikipedia entry on the “Standard of Living in India” 
(although I have had little success in tracking down the origin of that number). The surveys done 
by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) are often used in defining 
India’s middle class; based on that source, Sridharan (2004) gives a range of definitions implying 
that 100-250 million people are middle class in India around 2000. From the most recent 
NCAER survey, Shukla (2008) deems 25 million households (about 120 million people) to be 
middle class in 2007-08. As we will see, all these estimates far exceed the likely number of 
people in India who are not poor by US standards. 
One can also question the relevance of other definitions found in the literature. It seems 
implausible that a definition of the middle class relevant to developing countries would be 
centered on the median, which might more reasonably be deemed a lower bound. And, while 
some degree of arbitrariness in such measurement efforts is inevitable, one might wonder what 
meaning can be attached to the Banerjee-Duflo bounds of $2 and $10.   
The definition proposed here is close to the Banerjee-Duflo definition, but I try to give 
the bounds more meaning. The developing world’s middle class is defined as those who are not 
deemed “poor” by the standards of developing countries but are still poor by the standards of rich 
countries. For the lower bound I will use the median poverty line in poverty lines for 70 national 
poverty lines, drawn from in-country poverty measurement studies by the World Bank and 
national governments; the data on national poverty lines are described in Ravallion et al. (2008). 
                                                 
8   I have used the line for a family of four from the web site of the US Department of Health and Human Services. 
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Each of the national poverty lines in this sample is designed to attain recommended food-energy 
requirements with (socially-specific) allowances for basic nonfood needs. The median of these 
national lines is $2.00 per day at 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) using the PPPs for 
household consumption from the 2005 International Comparison Program (World Bank, 2008; 
www.worldbank.org/data/icp). As we will see, this is only slightly below the median for the 
population of the developing world as a whole.  
By definition, half the developing countries in the Ravallion et al. sample have national 
poverty lines below $2 a day.9 For example, the official poverty lines in both China and India are 
only about half this figure, so there are many people who are not poor by official standards in 
both countries who are not yet “middle class” by my definition. Nonetheless, there can be no 
doubt that $2 a day is a frugal lower bound even amongst developing countries. There is a 
marked economic gradient in national poverty lines, reflecting more generous (food and 
nonfood) allowances for “basic needs” as countries develop (Ravallion et al., 2008). The highest 
line in the Ravallion et al. sample of developing countries is $9 a day (for Uruguay). For some 
purposes, I will also focus on what might be termed the developing world’s upper middle class, 
for which the lower bound is $9 a day. 
As an upper bound for defining the developing world’s middle class, I will use the 
aforementioned US poverty line of $13 a day at 2005 PPP. This is a long way from the reach of 
those who are poor by developing-world standards. At an income growth rate of (say) 5% per 
year it would take almost 40 years to bring someone living on $2 a day up to the US poverty line; 
even at a growth rate of 10% it would take 20 years. Clearly $2-$13 is a wide interval.  
I will not say that someone has entered the Western middle class until the person has 
reached the US poverty line, which accords closely with the lower bound of the Milanovic-
Yitzhaki definition.   
When talking about a growing economy, finding more density toward the middle could 
simply be due to that growth. It is also of interest to isolate the extent of the middle-income 
bulge that is attributable to changing distribution. There are a number of ways one might do this. 
The literature on the rise of the middle class in the US has often used a standard inequality 
measure. However, such a measure need not reflect well the extent to which density has shifted 
                                                 
9  For measuring extreme poverty, Ravallion et al. (2008) recommend a lower line of $1.25 a day. This is the 
average poverty line of the 15 poorest countries in the world.  
 5
relative to the median; in particular, Wolfson (1994, 1997) points out that shifts in density away 
from the median, and from the lower and upper extremes, can be generated by transfers that 
entail lower inequality (by the usual transfer axiom used in inequality measurement).  
A better measure from this point of view is the Foster-Wolfson (FW) “polarization 
index,” based on the spread relative to the median of incomes normalized by the median.10 More 
precisely the polarization index is the area under the “polarization curve” given by the vertical 
distance between the Lorenz curve and the tangent to that curve at the median. This gives how 
far each percentile is from the median. The emergence of a middle-income bulge due to a change 
in distribution can be interpreted as a downward shift in the polarization curve. To avoid 
confusion about “which way is up” I will use 100 minus the FW index (in %), and I shall refer to 
this as the FW index of concentration around the median rather than “polarization.” This 
provides a convenient summary statistic, although (as noted above), it is questionable whether 
the median is the relevant anchor in poor countries.  
However, there is a more natural, and less restrictive, way of assessing the contribution of 
distributional changes to the “bulging middle,” namely to construct a counterfactual for the 
second date in which the Lorenz curve does not change relative to the base date, but the overall 
growth rate is the same as that observed in the data.11 I will also examine whether there is a 
bulging middle relative to this distribution-neutral counterfactual. 
 
2. Evidence on the developing world’s expanding middle class 
Using almost 700 household surveys for 115 developing countries, Chen and Ravallion 
(2008) estimate poverty measures for a range of international poverty lines anchored to the 
definitions of “poverty” found in practice in poor countries. The salient features of the Chen-
Ravallion estimation methods are as follows. Each international poverty line was converted to 
local currencies in the benchmark year (2005) using the consumption PPP for 2005 from the ICP. 
It was then converted to the prices prevailing at the time of the relevant household survey using 
the best available consumer price index for that country. Then the poverty rate was calculated 
from that survey by standard methods. Interpolation and extrapolation methods were used to line 
                                                 
10  Wolfson (1994) refers to an earlier, un-published, paper with James Foster as the source of the concepts of a 
polarization curve and polarization index.   
11  This approach is in the spirit of the Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition of changes in poverty measures into 
“growth” and “redistribution” components. 
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up the survey-based estimates with common reference years across countries, including 2005. 
Population-weighted aggregate measures were then formed by region and globally. 
Table 1 reproduces the Chen-Ravallion estimates of the poverty rate for the $2 a day line. 
Some notation will help for brevity. Let  is the poverty rate (often called the “headcount 
index”) at date t=(19)90 and (20)05 for the poverty line z in $’s per day at 2005 PPP. So Table 1 
gives  and  by region and in the aggregate for the developing world.  
)(zFt
)2(90F )2(05F
On repeating these calculations using the $13 a day line, I find that over 95% of the 
developing world in 2005 is deemed to be poor by US standards; Table 2 gives my estimates of 
 and . It is striking how few people in the developing world are not poor by US 
standards. Possibly most notable is the count for India, which implies that only three million 
people are not poor by this standard. Under-reporting of consumptions in India’s National 
Sample Surveys, or selective compliance in the survey’s random samples, could well be leading 
to an under-counting of those not poor by US standards. But even if we use a poverty line of $9 a 
day—equivalent to using the US poverty line but increasing all consumption levels by about 
50%, which would seem a very large adjustment for measurement error—the count of those in 
India who are not poor by US standards rises to only six million in 2005. 
)13(90F )13(05F
It is no less striking how little  has fallen very little over time—by only one half of 
a percentage point (Table 2). So the number of people living in poverty by US standards has 
risen over the period. In 2005, there were only 250 million people in the developing world who 
were not poor by US standards, rising from 170 million in 1990. Defining the “Western middle 
class” as those living above the US poverty line, the developing world added 80 million to the 
count of the middle class by this definition over 1990-2005.  
)13(tF
Notice that, on comparing Tables 1 and 2, China’s poverty ranking changes relative to the 
rest of the developing world. Using the $2 line, China had a lower incidence of poverty than the 
average excluding China in 2005, but this reverses using the $13 line; less than 2% (25 million 
people) of China’s population had attained the US poverty line in 2005.12  China’s accounted for 
about one quarter of the increase in the size of the Western middle class over this period. 
                                                 
12  The 2005 ICP round was the first time that China had participated officially in the ICP, and the price data imply a 
higher PPP than past estimates from other sources, implying that China is poorer than we thought. The estimates 
reported here have attempted to correct for the “urban bias” in the sample frame of the 2005 ICP for China; for 
details see Chen and Ravallion (2009).    
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It is plain from Tables 1 and 2 that a large middle-income bulge emerged. Table 3 gives 
the population share of the developing world’s middle class—the proportion living between $2 
and $13 a day ( ). This increased from 33% in 1990 to 49% in 2005, or from 1.4 
billion to 2.6 billion people. China accounts for half of this increase and East Asia as a whole for 
two-thirds. In 1990, only 15% of the Chinese population lived above $2 but below $13; by 2005 
the proportion had risen to 62%. Though not as large (absolutely or proportionately) as for 
China, India saw an extra 117 million people join this middle-income group. Asia as a whole 
(east and south) accounts for 81% of the expansion in the number living between $2 and $13 per 
day. All regions of the developing world saw an increase in 
)2()13( tt FF −
)2()13( tt FF −  except Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia where the number fell slightly over the period. 
Where is the bulge within the (2, 13) interval of incomes? The empirical estimates of the 
CDF’s and densities for 1990 and 2005 are given in Figure 2.13 While a reduction in poverty is 
indicated for all lines, it is clear that this has not been a simple rightward displacement of the 
density function. Indeed, the mode has remained almost unchanged over this period, at around 
$1.00 per day. The mean and median have increased, from $3.14 and $3.94 per day for 1990 and 
2005 respectively for the mean, while the medians were $1.47 and $2.13.  Instead of a simple 
rightward displacement, we have seen a marked “bunching up” due to a shift in densities from 
below the $2 a day line to just above it, with the bulk of the gain in the interval $2 to $6 a day. 
The bulge in 2005 is mostly above the median. Figure 3 gives )()( 9005 zFzF −  for 130 ≤< z , i.e., 
the extent to which the poverty rate has fallen according to different poverty lines up to the US 
line. It can be seen that the reduction in the poverty rate peaks at about $1.50 a day (almost 
exactly the 1990 median). The impact on the poverty rate falls below 5% points at poverty lines 
of about $6 a day or higher. 
It is clear that very little of the expansion in the developing world’s middle class was due 
to its “upper middle class,” namely those living above the highest poverty line found amongst 
developing countries, but still below the US line. Over 1990-2005, the estimated value of 
 rose from 3.1% to 4.3%, or from 139 million to 233 million. Of the extra 1.2 
billion people who joined the middle class, only 95 million made it to this upper stratum. 
)9()13( tt FF −
                                                 
13  The densities were estimated by taking the empirical derivatives of the estimated CDFs derived using PovcalNet 
for each of 25 selected poverty lines.   
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The shift in the density functions reflects in part the overall positive growth in the mean. 
Recall that two methods are to be used for isolating the contribution of distributional shifts. The 
first method is the Foster-Wolfson index of concentration around the median. This rose from 
61.3% to 63.9% over 1990-2005, indicating that the changes in the distribution of incomes 
normalized by the median entailed higher concentration around the median.  
The second method uses the aforementioned distribution-neutral counterfactual, as in 
Figure 3. Here I have calculated the poverty impacts when the distribution moves horizontally 
according to the proportionate increase in the mean between 1990 and 2005, i.e., all 1990 income 
levels are scaled up by the same growth rate, leaving relative distribution at its 1990 level.  
Comparing the two curves in Figure 3, it is evident that the actual changes in relative 
distribution had substantial impacts on poverty, as judged by developing country standards. 
Under the counterfactual we would have seen lower poverty impacts at low poverty lines and 
higher impacts at high lines. When assessed relative to this counterfactual, the bulge now starts 
below the 2005 median and persists until a turning point at about $8 per day. If we define the 
bulge as more than a 2 percentage point gap between the actual and counterfactual distributions 
then it spans the interval $1.00-$5.00 per day, containing 63% of the developing world’s 
population. (The region $1.25-$5.00 contains 53% of the population.) If instead we define the 
bulge as more than a 6 percentage point gap then the region narrows to about $1.50-$3.00 a day 
(or about 0.6 median to 1.4 median); 30% of the population is in this interval. 
Focusing on the $2 a day line, the actual growth process of the developing world implied 
a 25.8% (proportionate) reduction in the poverty rate over 1990-2005 (Table 1). The implied 
elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to the overall survey mean is -1.0. By contrast, the 
counterfactual growth process implies a 15.0% drop in the $2 a day poverty rate and an elasticity 
of -0.6. The overall growth process in the developing world has clearly been more pro-poor than 
implied by distribution-neutral growth. 
The elasticity varies markedly with the poverty line. Figure 4 gives the elasticity of  
with respect to the mean holding relative distribution constant across the full range of poverty 
lines; given that  is homogeneous of degree zero in the mean and z the point elasticity is 
given by  (Kakwani, 1993). The absolute elasticity falls sharply at poverty liens 
under $2 a day, from 3.0 at a line around $1.00 a day to 1.0 at around $2. The figure also gives 
the elasticities that would have been obtained in 2005 if the growth process over 1990-2005 had 
)(zFt
)(zFt
(/) zFt )(zzf t−
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been distribution-neutral for the developing world as a whole. The distributional shifts have 
raised the elasticity across all line, but only noticeably so over about $2 a day.  
 
3. Bulging middles within developing countries? 
For each of almost 100 developing countries, it is possible to assess whether there has 
been a bulging middle over time. I have constructed the longest spells between two surveys, both 
using the same indicator, either consumption or income per person.14 The median year of the 
first survey is 1991 while the median for the second is 2004. The median interval between 
surveys is 13 years and the interval varies from three to 27 years. All changes between the 
surveys are annualized. Again I use both the changes in the population share between $2 and $13
a day and the changes in the FW index of concentration around the median. Recall that the 
former measure directly reflects growth in the mean, while the latter is a distributional measure;
also examine distributional changes in the former measure. Precise sample sizes vary depe





Some further notation will be useful. Let the absolute and proportionate annualized 
differences for the variable x be iitititi ixxxd ττ /)()( −−≡  and  iitititi ixxxg ττ /)ln(ln)( −−≡  
respectively, for country i looking back from date t over a time interval of length iτ . Note that 
 is simply the average growth rate of x over the period, so (.)ig )( itig μ  is the rate of growth in 
the mean, itμ . Also let  denote the CDF for country i at date t, giving the proportion of the 
population living in households with consumption or income not exceeding z in $’s per day at 
2005 PPP.  (So  is the population weighted mean of  over all i.) In measuring the 
size of the middle class in a given country, I will use both the absolute difference 







)13()13 −(itFitA ≡ itit FR ≡ . Note that  is also 
the difference in growth rates for the poverty measures evaluated at $13 and $2 a day. 
)( iti Rg
 
Sizes of the middle class across countries 
Table 4 gives a 5x5 contingency table that summarizes the joint distribution across the 
two survey rounds of the sizes of the middle class across countries. A strong positive correlation 
                                                 
14  When both were available, consumption was generally preferred The only exception was Peru, for which a much 
longer time period could be covered using income-based distributions. 
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is evident.15 There are two main off-diagonal elements. The first is the expanding middle-class 
amongst those countries that started with middle-class shares less than 40%. Secondly there is a 
marked fall in the size of the middle-class in some countries that started with a large share (over 
80%) of the population in the $2-$13 interval; some of this is undoubtedly measurement error. 
Figure 5 plots the size of the middle class for the latest survey against the earliest (i.e., 
 against ). The regression line has a slope significantly less than unity; the regression 




16 (The fixed point solution is at a middle-class share of 63.5%.) The share of the 
population living between $2 and $13 a day rose in 64 out of the 99 countries. The mean  
was 0.22 percentage points per year and the median was 0.45 percentage points per year. The 
mean  is 0.024 (and the median is 0.011) or a growth rate of about 2% per year.  
)( iti Ad
(i Rg
There is a markedly bimodal distribution across countries in the population shares living 
between $2 and $13 a day; this is evident in the clustering of data points in Figure 5 but is easier 
to see in the kernel density functions for  and  in Figure 6.itA τ−itA
17 Taking a share of 40% as 
the cut-off point, 30 countries are in the lower mode and 69 are in the upper one for the most 
recent survey; the corresponding counts for the earliest surveys are 42 and 57 (Table 4). Over
time, there has been a shift of density toward the upper mode, away from the lower 
 
one. 
                                                
There is a notable regional concentration of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries in the 
lower mode. Two-thirds (20 out of 30) of the lower-mode countries in Figure 6 for the most 
recent survey rounds in SSA (versus 29% for the sample as a whole) and over two-thirds (20 out 
of 29) of the SSA countries in the sample are in the lower mode. In the latest survey rounds, the 
mean population share in the $2-$13 interval for SSA was 27.6% (s.e.=3.5%) as compared to 
63.5% (s.e.=2.3%) in the set of all other countries. In the earliest survey rounds, the 
corresponding means were 22.9% (4.3%) and 58.8% (2.9%).18 (In both cases, the difference 
between SSA and non-SSA countries is statistically significant at the 1% level.)  
 
15  Cramer’s V statistic is 0.453 and the contingency coefficient is 0.671. Pearson’s test gives a Chi-square of 81.35, 
which is significant at better than the 1% level. 
16  All standard errors reported in this paper are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s method. 
17  The fact that Figure 4 suggests “convergence” to a common signal middle-class share yet there is marked 
bimodality in the densities echoes Quah’s (1996) critique of past interpretations of “growth regressions.”  
18  The population share in the $2-$13 interval is also correlated with whether the survey used consumption or 
income, with lower share for consumption surveys. However, this difference vanishes if one controls for SSA 
countries; the correlation stems from the fact that SSA countries have mostly used consumption.   
 11
Does the middle class expand or contract as an economy grows? Plainly that depends on 
whether growth is more effective in reducing poverty by the standards of poor countries, or 
poverty by US standards. Empirically, the answer is clear: the pace at which the middle-class 
expands tends to be higher in more rapidly growing economies. The correlations are higher for 
the proportionate changes in the middle’s population share; the annualized change in the log of 
the ratio of the proportion living below $13 to that below $2 has correlation coefficients of 0.55 
and 0.37 with the growth rates in the survey means and national accounts (NAS) consumption 
per capita respectively. The corresponding correlations with the annualized changes in the levels 
of the population shares living between $2 and $13 are 0.28 and 0.19. Figure 7 plots the 
proportionate middle-income bulges ( ) against the growth rates in the means, )( iti Rg )( itig μ . 
The regression coefficient in Figure 7 is 1.248 with a robust standard error of 0.212 (n=91) and 
R2=0.333. Evidently this regression coefficient is the difference between the regression 
coefficient of  on ))13(( iti Fg )( itig μ  and that for  on ))2(( iti Fg )( itig μ . Thus the positive growth 
effect in Figure 7 can be interpreted as saying that the growth elasticity of poverty reduction is 
greater (in absolute value) for the lower poverty line. The regression coefficient of  on ))2(( iti Fg
)( itig μ  is -1.372 (s.e.=0.231; n=91) while the corresponding regression coefficient for 
 is -0.124 (s.e.=0.036), although it is higher if one uses all the observations (including 
those for which  cannot be calculated given that one or both poverty rates are zero); f
that sample the coefficient is -0.20 (s.e.=0.05; n=99).   
))13(( iti Fg
))2(( iti Fg or 
There is no sign at country level of a non-zero mean distributional effect on the size of 
the middle-class. This is evident in Figure 7, on noting that the regression line passes though the 
(0,0) point, implying that the ratio of the population share under $13 to that under $2 is roughly 
stationary at zero growth. (The intercept of the regression in Figure 7 is 0.003 with a standard 
error of 0.006.)  So the overall distributional effect on the expansion in the middle class for the 
developing world as a whole is driven largely by the between-country effect rather than within-
country. Even so, changes in distribution (in both directions) within countries have contributed to 
the changes in the size of their middle class. This is suggested by the fact that the growth rates in 
the mean only explains one third of the variance in Figure 7, although measurement errors are 
likely to be playing a role and it is difficult to distinguish these from idiosyncratic distributional 
shifts. It is at least suggestive that if one adds to the regression in Figure 7 a control for changes 
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in inequality (measures by the log difference in the Gini index) this is significant (at the 5% 
level), with a negative coefficient, and the share of the variance explained rises to one half.  
 
Concentration around the median 
The mean Foster-Wolfson index rose only slightly over the period, at 63.9% and 64.9% 
for 1990 and 2005 respectively; the median increased from 64.6% and 65.6%.19 The density of 
the annualized growth rates in the FW index is centered at a small negative value; the mean 
change is -0.13% per year. The index has fallen slightly more often than it has risen; 48 out of 91 
countries show a decrease. The majority of developing countries have not experienced higher 
density in a neighborhood of the (country-specific) median, although there has been a clear 
tendency for bunching up above the $2 line. Consider, for example, the two most populous 
countries, China and India. In marked contrast to the findings in Table 3, China’s FW index has 
tended to fall over time, while India’s has remained largely unchanged.20  
 As an aside, it can be noted that, despite the conceptual differences noted by Wolfson 
(1994, 1997), the FW index is highly correlated with a standard inequality index.21 The 
correlation coefficients between the FW index of polarization and the Gini index of inequality in 
the most recent surveys is 0.94 (and 0.92 for the earliest survey). The correlation coefficient 
between the changes over time in the two measures is 0.83.  However, the Gini index is the 
better predictor of changes in the poverty rate; if one includes both the change in the log Gini 
index and the change in the log FW polarization index as extra controls in the regression of 
 on )( iti Rg )( itig μ  (Figure 7) only the Gini index is significant at the 5% level. 
There is little sign that changes in the FW index of concentration around the median have 
been correlated with rates of economic growth over the same time period. The correlation 
coefficients between the annualized growth rate in the index and the real annualized growth rate 
in the survey mean is 0.09 while the correlation with the corresponding growth rates in real 
consumption per capita from the national accounts is 0.00. It is not the case that more rapidly 
                                                 
19  Given that these mean FW indices across countries do no include the between-country component of the 
distributional change, they are higher than the overall FW indices reported earlier in this paper. Recall also that this 
is 100 minus the usual FW “polarization” index. 
20  For the longest time periods available, China’s FW index fell from 74.5% to 61.1% over 1981-2005, while 
India’s remained fairly similar, at 75.0% and 74.5% for 1977/78 and 2004/05 respectively. 
21  A similar point is made by Zhang and Kanbur (2001), using data for China. 
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growing developing economies have experienced higher (or lower) rates of increase in the extent 
of polarization by this measure.  
However, there is a strong positive correlation between the initial level of mean 
consumption and the subsequent change in the FW index; Figure 8 plots the annualized 
proportionate change in the index against the log of the initial mean.22 The correlation is just as 
strong with the initial $2 a day poverty rate (r=-0.33), and the turning point is at a poverty rate of 
24.83% (s.e.=8.78%).  So there is evidence of a middle-income bulge relative to the median 
emerging in the poorer countries within the developing world. 
 Table 5 brings the above observations together in the form of regressions for the growth 
rates (annualized log differences) in the two measures used above; the regressors are the growth 
rate and the initial mean, using both survey means and household consumption per capita from 
the NAS. The growth effects on the bulge in the population shares in the ($2, $13) interval are 
evident for both surveys means and NAS data, though smaller for the latter. Note that the effect 
of the initial mean has opposite effects on the two dependent variables. Given that the regression 
includes the growth rate, the coefficient on the initial mean can be interpreted as a distributional 
effect. So the finding that the distributional effects in poorer countries tended to generate greater 
bulge around the median is not robust to the choice of that measure in that focusing on the 
income space above $2 a day gives the opposite conclusion. This sensitivity to the choice of 
measure is probably not too surprising given that the FW index is centered on the median while 
the bulk of the shift in density relative to the distribution-neutral counterfactual is to a region 
somewhat above the median. In fact, on controlling for the growth rate, I find no significant 
partial correlation between the two measures (a t-statistic of 0.78 using the growth rate in the 
survey mean and 1.34 using the growth rate for NAS consumption).   
 
4. Does a larger middle class help assure pro-poor growth? 
 Looking back over time, the countries with a larger middle-class tended to attain higher 
subsequent rates of poverty reduction from a given rate of growth. Regressing the rates of 
poverty reduction ( ) on both the rate of growth ())2(( iti Fg )( itig μ ) and its interaction with either 
the absolute share of the population in the middle class ( ) or the log relative share ( ) I τ−itA τ−itRln
                                                 
22  Figure 7 uses the survey means. The correlation is also found using private consumption per capita from the 
national accounts (r=0.31; prob.=0.006). The correlation is also robust to adding a regression control for the initial 
level of the polarization index. 
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found that the interaction effect has a significant negative coefficient. However, I also found that 
this effect was almost entirely attributable to the poverty rate for the $2 line; it is the differences 
in the extent of poverty by this line that account for the bulk of the cross-country variance in the 
size of the middle class. 
So the (absolute) growth elasticity of poverty reduction tends to be lower in countries 
with a higher initial poverty rate.23 Poorer countries tend to experience lower proportionate 
impacts on their poverty measures from any given rate of growth. Furthermore, the countries 
with high current poverty rates have tended to experience less middle-income bulge.24 All this 
suggests that those countries that have enjoyed the largest expansions in their middle class that 
will be most vulnerable to aggregate economic downturns in the wake of the crisis.  
However, there is an important caveat to this argument. It is not the proportionate impact 
on poverty that one is most concerned with in this context, but the absolute impact, for that is 
what matters to the number of people experiencing extreme poverty. When talking about the 
developing world as a whole, this is not an issue. But it is relevant to cross-country comparisons. 
Furthermore, the tendency for growth to be less poverty-reducing in poorer countries vanishes 
when one focuses instead on the absolute impacts. This is evident from the regressions reported 
in Table 6. The left panel (regressions (1)-(4)) gives regressions of the annualized change in the 
log of the $2 a day poverty rate against both the annualized growth rate in the mean and its 
interaction with the initial poverty rate. Both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental 
Variables (IV) estimators are given; the IV method uses the growth rate in private consumption 
per capita from the NAS as the instrument for the growth rate in the survey mean.25 The table 
                                                 
23  Mathematically, this elasticity will be a function of the mean (relative to the poverty line) and the properties of 
the Lorenz curve, roughly interpretable as “inequality.” Ravallion (1997) argued that in high inequality countries the 
poor will tend to have a lower share of the gains from growth and showed that this holds empirically; this was 
substantiated in a larger data set by Ravallion (2007). Ravallion (1997) did not, however, find empirically that the 
growth elasticity of poverty reduction varied systematically with the mean. Lopez and Serven (2006) show that if 
incomes are log-normally distributed, then such a variation with the mean is implied theoretically, and they show 
that log-normality is a good approximation empirically. Easterly (2009) conjectures that the initial poverty rate is 
likely to be the better predictor of the elasticity though no evidence is provided. The results reported in the present 
paper, on a larger and better quality data set than used by Ravallion (1997, 2007), suggest that differences in the 
initial mean are important for explaining differences in the elasticity, and that the initial poverty rate is an even 
better predictor than the initial mean, consistently with Easterly’s conjecture.   
24  The correlation coefficient between the log of the $2 a day poverty rate in the most recent survey and the 
proportionate increase in the share of the population between $2 and $13 a day is 0.620. 
25  Following Ravallion (2001), this IV allows for the possibility that a spurious negative correlation exists due to 
common measurement errors (given that the poverty measure and the mean are calculated from the same surveys) 
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also gives homogeneity tests, which pass comfortably; by implication, the relevant growth rate is 
the poverty adjusted rate, as given by the growth rate times one minus the poverty rate.      
The positive interaction effects between the growth rate and the initial poverty rate for the 
regressions (1)-(4) in Table 6 confirm that the (absolute) growth elasticity of poverty reduction 
tends to be lower in poorer countries.26 However, when we turn to the right panel (regressions 
(5) and (6)) the interaction effect vanishes—indeed it switches sign. In terms of the absolute 
impacts on poverty, higher growth tends to be more poverty reducing in poorer countries, n
less. Conversely, the poorer the country, the greater the absolute impact on poverty that is to
expected from any given rate of aggregate economic contraction. 
ot 
 be 
This distinction between the proportionate and absolute impacts of economic growth on 
poverty has an important implication for development efforts to attain the first Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG1), namely to halve the 1990 poverty rate by 2015. Easterly (2009) 
argues that MDG1 is harder to achieve in Africa because the growth elasticities of poverty 
reduction are likely to be lower (in absolute value) than elsewhere, given that poverty incidence 
tends to be higher. The results of the present paper make clear that this argument depends 
crucially on the fact that MDG1 calls for a common proportionate decrease.  
When applied to specific countries, this is an odd feature of MDG1. Aiming for a 
common proportionate decrease is plainly inconsistent with an aid strategy that focuses on 
reducing aggregate poverty (no matter where one happens to live) using aid allocations across 
countries that differ in the relevant parameters (growth prospects, aid effectiveness in promoting 
growth, growth elasticities of poverty and initial levels of poverty).27 While it might be a moot 
point how much aid allocations in practice are guided by MDG1 (or aggregate poverty 
reduction), it can be argued that focusing on MDG1 at country level is not only unfair to Africa 
but would also distort aid policies against attaining MDG1 in the aggregate. 
  
                                                 
26  It might be conjectured that this is an “Africa effect” given past findings in the literature indicating that SSA 
tends to have lower growth elasticities of poverty reduction (Chen and Ravallion, 2004, 2008). However, the effect 
persists (with similar size and significance) if one adds a dummy variable for SSA countries (both on its own and 
interacted with the growth rate) to these regressions. 
27  The marginal impact of external aid (per capita) to a given country on the number of poor in the world is given by 
the product of the (country-specific) values of the growth elasticity of poverty reduction, the marginal impact on log 
mean income of extra aid and the initial poverty rate in that country. Minimizing aggregate poverty by equating 




Like “poverty,” the term “middle-class” is defined differently in different countries at 
different levels of economic development. Some observers have applied a rich-world concept of 
what it means to be middle class to the developing world. By one such definition found in the 
literature barely one person in 20 is deemed to be middle class in the developing world, and that 
proportion has changed little between 1990 and 2005, though with population growth an extra 80 
million people in the developing world joined this “Western middle class” over that period.   
This paper has focused instead on a definition that seems more defensible in the context 
of developing countries. Someone is identified as being in the developing world’s middle class if 
she lives in a household with consumption per capita between $2 and $13 a day at 2005 
purchasing power parity. The lower bound is the median poverty line of developing countries 
while the upper bound is based on the US poverty line. In 1990, about one person in three in the 
developing world was middle class by this definition; by 2005 the proportion had risen to one-in-
two. An extra 1.2 billion people joined the middle class over 1990-2005.  
This expansion in the middle class was not simply a horizontal shift in distribution 
whereby all income levels rise by a similar proportion. Instead, the huge expansion in the size of 
the developing world’s middle class reflects global distributional shifts that have entailed greater 
poverty reduction at low poverty lines than one would have expected under a distribution-neutral 
growth process. The modal income level has increased very little with the rise in the mean. 
Instead, fewer people live near the mode, and densities have become “bunched up” just above $2 
a day.  
The more dense middle of the distribution can thus be seen as an implication of a pattern 
of aggregate economic growth in the developing world as a whole that has favored very poor 
people. The high growth rates of China and India have played an important role in producing the 
middle-income bulge in the developing world as a whole; indeed, China alone accounts for half 
of the 1.2 billion new entrants to the middle-class over 1990-2005.  
The vulnerability of this new middle class to aggregate economic contraction is obvious; 
one-in-six people in the developing world now live between $2 and $3 per day. As the 
developing world confronts the spillover effects of the global financial crisis, lower growth rates 
are expected, with forecasts being revised downwards rapidly (as I write in late 2008), though 
with positive growth still expected. Whether the overall pace of poverty reduction slows, or is 
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even reversed, will depend crucially on the incidence of the impacts of the crisis across 
countries. It is clear from the calculations reported in this paper that maintaining growth in Asia 
will be especially important to preventing a slowdown in overall progress against poverty. 
Continuing growth in China and India is still expected, albeit it at a lower rate.  
An exploration of how distributions have changed across developing countries reveals 
that, although China and India have naturally carried a large weight in the aggregate outcomes, 
the expansion in the middle class is evident for about 70% of countries. Two types of countries 
are now found within the developing world, according to whether they have a large middle class 
or a small one. Over time, the developing world has become even more polarized between these 
two groups of countries. 
One’s vulnerable to lower growth depends of course on where one lives. The extent of 
the middle class within a country is relevant, but the nature of its relevance might not be as 
obvious as one thinks. There is a “middle-class advantage” in attaining pro-poor growth in that a 
given rate of growth tends to bring higher proportionate impacts on poverty in developing 
countries that started the growth process with a larger middle class. This middle-class advantage 
is mainly due to initial differences in the incidence of extreme poverty. Starting out with a high 
poverty rate makes it harder to achieve a given proportionate impact on the poverty count 
through economic growth. That is not, however, true for the absolute impacts, and in making 
cross-country comparisons of progress against poverty it is probably better to use absolute 
impacts. A given rate of economic growth tends to yield a larger reduction in the poverty rate in 
poorer countries. By the same token, poor people living in countries with smaller middle classes 
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          Figure 2: Distributions for the developing world as a whole in 1990 and 2005    
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Figure 3: Assessing the bulge relative to distribution-neutral growth 
       
Figure 4: Elasticities of 2005 poverty rate to distribution-neutral growth 
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         Figure 5: Middle-class share (F(13)-F(2)) across two surveys for same country 
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Table 1: Poor by the standards of developing countries 
Number living below $2 
a day (millions) 
Percentage of 
population 
Region 1990 2005 1990 2005 
East Asia and Pacific  1273.7 728.7 79.8 38.7 
Of which China 960.8 473.7 84.6 36.3 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 31.9 41.9 6.9 8.9 
Latin America and Caribbean 95.9 94.3 21.9 17.1 
Middle East and North Africa 44.4 51.5 19.7 16.9 
South Asia 926.0 1091.5 82.7 73.9 
Of which India 701.6 827.7 82.6 75.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 392.9 555.9 76.1 72.9 
Total 2764.9 2563.9 63.4 47.0 
Total excluding China 1804.1 2090.2 55.9 50.4 
Source: Author’s calculations using PovcalNet. 
 
 
Table 2: Poor by US standards 
Number living below $13 
a day (millions) 
Percentage of 
population 
Region 1990 2005 1990 2005 
East Asia and Pacific  1589.2 1845.8 99.6 98.0 
Of which China 1134.5 1279.7 99.9 98.1 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 387.2 389.7 83.1 82.3 
Latin America and Caribbean 372.6 456.5 85.1 82.9 
Middle East and North Africa 214.7 291.6 95.2 95.5 
South Asia 1118.6 1471.7 99.9 99.7 
Of which India 848.3 1091.4 99.9 99.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 510.6 753.0 98.8 98.7 
Total 4193.0 5208.2 96.1 95.5 
Total excluding China 3058.5 3928.5 94.8 94.7 
Source: Author’s calculations using PovcalNet. 
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Table 3: Living between $2 a day and $13 a day 
Number living between $2 
and $13 per day (millions)
Percent of the 
population  






change 1990 2005 
East Asia and Pacific  315.5 1117.1     801.6 65.9 19.8 59.3 
Of which China 173.7 806.0 632.3 52.0 15.3 61.8 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 355.3 347.8 -7.5 -0.6 76.3 73.4 
Latin America and Caribbean 276.7 362.1 85.4 7.0 63.2 65.8 
Middle East and North Africa 170.2 240.1 69.9 5.7 75.5 78.7 
South Asia 192.7 380.2 187.5 15.4 17.2 25.8 
Of which India 146.8 263.7 116.9 9.6 17.3 24.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 117.7 197.1 79.4 6.5 22.8 25.8 
Total 1428.1 2644.3 1216.2 100.0 32.7 48.5 
Total excluding China 1254.4 1838.3 583.9 48.0 38.9 44.3 
Source: Author’s calculations using PovcalNet. 
 
Table 4: Joint distribution of countries by size of their middle-class 
   Middle-class population share in latest survey ( , %))2()13( tt FF −
Count of countries    [0, 20) [20, 40) [40, 60) [60, 80) [80, 100) Total 
[0, 20) 12 8 3 1 0 24 
[20, 40) 2 6 8 1 1 18 
[40, 60) 1 1 5 5 2 14 
[60, 80) 0 0 3 19 5 27 
[80, 100) 0 0 2 10 4 16 
Middle-class population 
share in earliest survey 
( , %) )2()13( ττ −− − tt FF
Total 15 15 21 36 12 99 
Source: Author’s calculations; see text. 
 
 
Table 5: Regressions for middle-income bulge over time 
 Change in log ratio of proportion 
under $13 to proportion under $2 
Change in log Foster-Wolfson index 
of  concentration around the median 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Survey mean National accounts 
consumption 






  0.031** 
(2.995) 
  0.021* 
( 2.095) 
Growth rate (annualized 
change in log mean, )( itig μ ) 
  1.384** 
(5.893) 
  0.830** 
(2.977) 












N 91 86 91 83 
R2 0.371 0.169 0.117 0.066 
Notes: The “mean” (both initial value and growth rate) is the survey mean in regressions (1) and (3) and private 
consumption per capita from the NAS in (2) and (4). The t-ratios based on robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
denotes significant at the 5% level; ** denotes significant at the 1% level.  
Source: Author’s calculations; see text.
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Table 6: Regressions for change in poverty rate as a function of growth rate and initial poverty level 
 Annualized change in poverty rate for $2 a day 
 Change in log poverty rate  
))2((( ) iti Fg
Change in level of poverty rate 
( ))2(( ) iti Fd
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













Growth rate (annualized change in 
log survey mean, )( itig μ ) 
   -2.615** 
(-6.608) 
   -3.323** 
(-4.560) 
n.a. n.a.     -0.207** 
(-4.203) 
  -0.242** 
(-3.152) 
Growth rate interacted with initial 
poverty rate ( )2().( τμ −ititi Fg ) 








(1-Poverty rate) times growth rate 
( ))2(1).(( τμ −− ititi Fg ) 





N 91 86 91 86 99 91 
R2 0.535 0.458 0.535 0.466 0.725 0.535 
Homogeneity test  0.037 -0.620 n.a. n.a. 6.970 5.623 
Notes: The t-ratios based on robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significant at the 5% level; ** denotes significant at the 1% level.  
The homogeneity test is the t-test for the sum of the coefficients on the growth rate and the growth rate interacted with initial poverty rate. 
Source: Author’s calculations; see text. 
